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Abstract
Consider a Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly with linear cost functions.
If the ﬁrms produce to stock then no Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies exists. If, however, the ﬁrms produce to order then all subgame
perfect Nash equilibria involve the ﬁrms charging a price equal to
marginal cost.
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Consider a Bertrand duopoly where the ﬁrms have identical and linear cost
functions and must supply the whole of the demand coming to them. It is
well known that there is a unique Nash equilibrium where both the ﬁrms
charge a price equal to marginal cost. In the literature this result is known
as the Bertrand (1833) paradox, since it suggests that competition among
only two ﬁrms may be suﬃcient to yield the perfectly competitive outcome
(see, for example, Tirole (1988), pp. 209-211).
Eﬀorts at resolving the Bertrand paradox have involved relaxing the
various assumptions underlying the model, e.g. that the cost functions are
linear, or that the product is homogeneous, etc. (see Tirole (1988), Chapter
5). In the process the Bertrand paradox has played an important role in the
development of the literature.
Here we focus on another critical assumption behind the Bertrand para-
dox, that ﬁrms must supply all demand. It is often implicitly assumed that
the result goes through even if this assumption is relaxed. In this paper,
however, we argue that the Bertrand paradox is fundamentally altered if the
ﬁrms are free to supply less than the quantity demanded (this assumption
is due to Edgeworth (1897)).
Given the Edgeworth (1897) assumption there are two ways of mod-
elling a game of price competition. Under the production to stock (or PTS)
framework, the ﬁrms simultaneously decide on both their price and output
levels.1 Under the production to order (or PTO) framework, however, the
1The PTS game can be interpreted as one with advance production, so that ﬁrms
must decide on their output levels before trading starts. Thus they make their price
and output decisions without knowing the price and output decisions of the other ﬁrms.
Retail markets are often characterized by such production conditions (see Mestelman et
al. (1987)).
1ﬁrms play a two stage game where they ﬁrst simultaneously decide on their
prices, and then on their output levels.
We ﬁnd that under PTS competition no pure strategy Nash equilibrium
exists, i.e. in this case we are faced with the Edgeworth (1897), rather than
the Bertrand (1833) paradox.2
Under PTO competition, however, all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in
pure strategies involve both the ﬁrms charging a price equal to the marginal
cost. The equilibria, however, are non-unique in terms of output and may
involve an aggregate supply that is less than demand. Thus in this case the
Bertrand (1833) paradox can be said to hold, but only partially.
2 The Model
There are 2 identical ﬁrms, both producing the same homogeneous good.
The market demand function is q = d(p) and the cost function of both the
ﬁrms is cq.
Assumption 1. ∀p > 0, d(p) is well deﬁned and once diﬀerentiable,
with d0(p) < 0 and bounded.
2Edgeworth (1897) used a Bertrand duopoly model with linear, but capacity con-
strained cost functions to argue that in such models equilibria in pure strategies may
not exist. This is the well known Edgeworth paradox (though Edgeworth (1897) himself
thought of this as a case of indeterminate equilibrium, with prices cycling within a certain
range). For a formal analysis of the Edgeworth (1897) paradox see, among others, Levitan
and Shubik (1972), Maskin and Tirole (1988) and Tasn´ adi (1999a).
Given the Edgeworth paradox, one strand of the literature looks for existence in mixed
strategies. One can mention, among others, Maskin (1986) who uses the ﬁxed point
theorems for discontinuous games developed by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) to show
existence of mixed strategy equilibria for both PTS and PTO games.
2Let Ri(p1,p2,qj), j 6= i, denote the residual demand facing ﬁrm i, where
Ri(p1,p2,qj) =

   
   
max[0,d(pi) − qj{λ + (1 − λ)
d(pi)
d(pj)}], if pi > pj,
max[
d(pi)
2 ,d(pi) − qj], if pi = pj,
d(pi), if pi < pj,
(1)
where λ ∈ [0,1].
The ﬁrst line of equation 1 (i.e. the rationing rule) draws heavily on
the combined rationing rule introduced by Tasn´ adi (1999b). Clearly, for
λ = 1 we have the eﬃcient rationing rule, whereas for λ = 0 we have
the proportional rationing rule (see Tirole (1988) and Vives (1999) for a
discussion of these two rationing rules). For intermediate values of λ other
rationing rules emerge. Thus this formulation allows for a large class of
rationing rules, including the two most well known one, the eﬃcient and the
proportional, as special cases.
The second line of equation 1 (i.e. the tie-breaking rule) follows Davidson
and Deneckere (1986) and Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). One nice feature of
this formulation is that it allows for the spill-over of unmet residual demand
from one ﬁrm to another. However we later argue, in Remarks 1 and 2, that
our results go through for other tie-breaking rules also.
We can now deﬁne the proﬁt function of the i-th ﬁrm.
πi(p1,p2,q1,q2) = pi min{qi,Ri(p1,p2,qj)} − cqi, i = 1,2. (2)
2.1 Production to Stock Framework
We ﬁrst examine a simultaneous move game where the i-th ﬁrm’s strategy
consists of choosing both a price pi ∈ [0,∞) and an output qi ∈ [0,∞).
We solve for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game.
Lemma 1 below is useful. The proof, which is standard, has been rele-
gated to the appendix.
3Lemma 1. Any Nash equilibrium must involve both the ﬁrms charging
a price equal to c.
Proposition 1 below shows that this game has no Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies.
Proposition 1. The production to stock game with linear cost functions
has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Given Lemma 1, it is suﬃcient to argue that any outcome,
(˜ p1, ˜ p2, ˜ q1, ˜ q2), where ˜ p1 = ˜ p2 = c, cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Consider some outcome (˜ p1, ˜ p2, ˜ q1, ˜ q2), where ˜ p1 = ˜ p2 = c. Suppose to
the contrary that this outcome is Nash. Since both the ﬁrms are charging c,
and the outcome is Nash, it must be that ˜ q1 + ˜ q2 ≤ d(c). Thus there exists
˜ qj such that d(c)− ˜ qj ≥
d(c)
2 > 0. Without loss of generality let j = 2. Since
d(c) − ˜ q2 ≥
d(c)
2 , it follows that R1(p1,c, ˜ q2) is right continuous at p1 = c.
Next suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates by charging a price p1 greater than c.
Note that, for p1 ≥ c, it is optimal for ﬁrm 1 to supply R1(p1,c, ˜ q2). Thus
for p1 ≥ c, the proﬁt of ﬁrm 1, assuming that its output level is optimal, is
π1(p1,c,R1(p1,c, ˜ q2), ˜ q2) = (p1 − c)R1(p1,c, ˜ q2). (3)
Hence, for p1 ≥ c,
∂π1(p1,c,R1(p1,c, ˜ q2), ˜ q2)
∂p1





∂π1(p1,c,R1(p1,c, ˜ q2), ˜ q2)
∂p1
|p1=c = R1(c,c, ˜ q2) = d(c) − ˜ q2 > 0. (5)
Thus ﬁrm 1 can increase its price slightly and gain.
4Remark 1. Note that Proposition 1 goes through even if the tie-breaking
rule is of the form
d(pi)
2 , or d(pi)
qi
q1+q2 (if q1 = q2 = 0, then the second tie-
breaking rule takes the form
d(pi)
2 ). Recall that these are the two examples
of tie-breaking rules provided in Maskin (1986). In both the cases it is
suﬃcient to observe that for the outcome, (˜ p1, ˜ p2, ˜ q1, ˜ q2), where ˜ p1 = ˜ p2 = c,
it must be the case that ˜ q1 + ˜ q2 ≤ d(c),3 so that d(c) − ˜ qj ≥
d(c)
2 > 0, for
some j. Thus the argument in Proposition 1 goes through.
2.2 Production to Order Framework
We next examine a two stage game where, in stage 1, the ﬁrms simultane-
ously decide on their price levels, and in stage 2, they simultaneously decide
on their quantity levels.
We then solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game in
pure strategies.
Proposition 2. If the ﬁrms produce to order and cost functions are






2 = c and q0
1+q0
2 ≤ d(c),
can be supported as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, no other
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
Proof. It is clear that Lemma 1 applies in this case as well.






2 = c and
q0
1+q0
2 ≤ d(c). It is suﬃcient to see that the following strategies sustain this
outcome as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
Stage 1. Both the ﬁrms charge a price equal to c.
Stage 2. In case both the ﬁrms charge c in stage 1, then, in stage
2, ﬁrm 1 supplies q0
1 and ﬁrm 2 supplies q0
2. If, in stage 1, one of the
3If, to the contrary, ˜ q1 + ˜ q2 > d(c), then one of the ﬁrms must be incurring losses.
5ﬁrms charges c, while the other ﬁrm charges a strictly higher price, then
in stage 2 the ﬁrm charging c supplies d(c), while the other ﬁrm supplies
nothing.
Interestingly, while the equilibrium price equals the perfectly competitive
level, the aggregate supply, q0
1+q0
2, may be less than the demand d(c). Thus
in this case the Bertrand paradox applies only partially. Of course, the
result, that in equilibrium supply can be less than demand, is paradoxical
in itself.
Remark 2. It is clear that Proposition 2 goes through even if the tie-
breaking rule is of the form d(pi)
qi
q1+q2. Whereas if the tie-breaking rule is
of the form
d(pi)











2 , constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Moreover, no
other subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.4
3 Conclusion
In this paper we examine a model of Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly where the
ﬁrms are free to supply less than the quantity demanded and cost functions
are linear. If the competition is of the production to stock type, then no
Nash equilibrium in pure strategy exists. If, however, the competition is of
the production to order type, then all subgame perfect Nash equilibria in
pure strategies involve both the ﬁrms charging a price equal to the marginal
cost. The aggregate supply, however, may be less than demand.
4It is easy to see that in both the cases the strategies outlined in the proof of Proposition
2 will work.
64 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider an outcome (ˆ p1, ˆ p2, ˆ q1, ˆ q2). We argue that for
this outcome to be a Nash equilibrium it is necessary that ˆ p1 = ˆ p2 = c.
Case 1. Suppose ˆ pi > ˆ pj > c. Then ﬁrm i can deviate by undercutting
ﬁrm j slightly and gain. Hence such a price conﬁguration cannot be a part
of a Nash equilibrium.
Case 2. Suppose ˆ pi > c ≥ ˆ pj. Then ﬁrm j can charge some p00
j, such
that ˆ pi > p00
j > c, and gain.
Case 3. Suppose that ˆ pi < ˆ pj ≤ c. Then ﬁrm j can charge a price
slightly higher than c and gain.
Case 4. Suppose ˆ p1 = ˆ p2 > c. Then ﬁrm 1 can undercut slightly and
gain.
Case 5. Suppose ˆ p1 = ˆ p2 < c. Then ﬁrm 1 can charge a price slightly
higher than c and gain.
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